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Professor Alchian's paper covers a broad range of subjects and ideas within 
the field of economic theory of organization. Right at the beginning he pro-
vides a list of 8 possible sources of economic misunderstanding to be found 
in debates on the role and the functioning of firms. European discussions 
of economic and institutional questions associated with firms would be en-
riched if they concentrated more on the kind of issues outlined at the very 
beginning of the paper. This catalogue could serve as a kind of checklist 
to find out whether a person participating in discussion within the field has 
done his homework. 
The picture of the economic theory of organization that Professor Alchian 
unfolds is very stimulating and offers many valuable insights. My comments 
concentrate on four subjectively chosen points though clearly there are more 
that could or should be discussed. 
1. The Concept of Resource Spec~ficity and its Significance for the Definition 
of Coalition and Management 
A considerable part of the paper is dedicated to development and discussion 
of the concept of resource specificity based on an earlier and wellknown article 
by KLEIN, CRAWFORD and ALCHIAN [1978]. This concept is the foundation 
stone upon which Professor Alchian outlines a general economic theory of 
contract. Resource specificity exists if a resource's value in the coalition is 
higher than elsewhere. The higher the specificity of a resource and the higher 
the expropriable quasi-rent that is inseperably linked with a specific resource, 
the more integrative and the more long-term-oriented contracting will take 
place in order to cope efficiently with the risks arising from that situation. 
Professor Alchian shows convincingly that this kind of reasoning is not re-
stricted to the explanation of firms but is also helpful when applied to that 
of many other social institutions. 
A first question concerns membership. A person is called a coalition member 
if their "wealth (or utility) is dependent on the actions of the coalition". 
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Thus it is very difficult to imagine that anyone transacting with another person 
will not form a coalition for the duration of the contract. The case of pure 
indifference between alternative courses of action is rare in economic life. 
Almost willy-nilly, transactions are engaged in because a comparative advan-
tage is discovered which does not seem appropriable otherwise and would 
be lost if the coalition/transaction fails, with consequent effects upon the re-
spective wealth positions. If this is a correct description of the concept, what 
would be the meaning of that implication of membership? 
However, more important than this aspect is the management question 
which comes with it. Professor A1chian states that "owners of the coalition-
specific resources want to be the managers more than do owners of the general 
resources". "Any person whose constrained, conditional distribution of effects 
on values of (specialized) resources in the coalition is wider is more of a 
manager - no matter what particular tasks he performs." 
Two remarks come into my mind when I think about this unu.sual definition 
of management: 
a. Does this mean that e.g. an operator in a power plant's central control 
room is more of a manager than the chief executive in charge because 
the operator's actions, based on the use of very specific know-how, can 
have more effect on the other's specific resources in the coalition? Similar 
examples refering to inside specialists or outside suppliers could be found. 
Are air traffic controllers among the managers of the economy? 
b. It seems to me that Professor A1chian's position could serve as an interest-
ing economic basis for institutionalization of participation or codetermina-
tion. If ownership of any specific resource brings about influence or even 
management, we would have available a litmus test for economically legiti-
mate participatory aspirations. 
However, later in the paper, Professor Alchian contradicts that point by 
arguing that worker participation would be nothing more but a "wealth 
confiscation scheme". He implies that workers hold only generalized re-
sources. I am not so sure that this is generally true. I can imagine many 
examples where at least certain groups of floor or office workers and of 
lower or middle managers do own resources that are highly specific to 
the coalition. 
2. Explanation of Limited Liability 
Though it is true that transferability of specialized resources is one argument 
for the formation of institutions with limited liability, especially for companies 
with public stock, I do not believe that it is the only one. Contrary to Professor 
Alchian, I believe that risk aversion still plays an important role in explaining 
limited liability. How otherwise could the fact be explained that there are 
many companies with limited liability in Germany whose shares are not easy 
4* 
52 Arnold Picot ZgS 
to transfer at all, not to speak of an anonymous transfer. And on the other 
hand: why is it that many businesses still do have unlimited liability (e.g. 
lawyers, physicians) and that these businesses, at the same time, are quite 
easily transferable? Limited liability could not assist them to recover their 
loss of prestige and human capital in case of a failure. 
3. Intra-firm Competition 
There is no doubt that it is important to apply economic concepts such as 
competition within organized institutions. Divisionalized organizations, intra-
finn transfer pricing, and intra-organizationallabor markets are well-known 
examples. However, I would like to add two qualifications to Professor AI-
chian's remarks on that field: 
a. Intra-firm competition can only function in an efficient manner, i.e. in 
a way which improves overall resource allocation, if the firm itself is under 
external competitive pressure. Otherwise internal competition takes place 
within a monopoly and degenerates into fonns of utility maximizations 
that do not serve the outside world. Thus, I doubt whether the newspaper 
example in Professor Alchian's paper is really convincing. 
b. One should not overestimate managers' capabilities to "act as surrogate 
markets". Though an experienced manager's judgement can in some cases 
substitute for outside market experimentation, this capability is fairly limit-
ed. Marketing literature is full of examples of surprises in both directions. 
Products highly scored by managers failed in the market place and products 
held in very low esteem by managers became very successful. For many 
types of products (not all) the infonnation processing abilities and discovery 
capabilities of markets are much greater than those of most managers. 
4. How Important is a Definition of "the Firm"? 
Adding to endeavours of others in our profession, Professor Alchian proposes 
a tentative definition of the firm involving two dimensions: measurement prob-
lems of input perfonnance and existence of expropriable quasi-rents. On this 
definition, the putting-out system could not be called a firm. It consists of 
interspecific resources .but it allows for measurement of the marginal producti-
vity of those working at home. Is a craftsman who leaves the accomplishment 
of single orders to one of his workers, the productivity of the latter being 
therefore measureable, not the head of a firm? Again, resource specificity 
is given but not the measurement problem. Thus measurement problems deriv-
ing from team production are one possible but not a necessary nor a sufficient 
reason for profit sharing or employment contracts. 
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Having such difficulties in mind I would rather and with much pleasure 
underwrite another statement of Professor Alchian: That the real question 
is "what kind of contractual relations are institutionalized in what circum-
stances." One should definitely agree: "It is hard to see what would be lost 
if the term firm were abandoned, except a source of confusion" and, I would 
add, a source of unjustified simplification. The at first sight so clear-cut distinc-
tion between "market" and "hierarchy" (or firm), to be found in most of 
our textbooks and even dividing our disciplines, obscures the diverse and 
much more complex nature of organizational modes suitable for overcoming 
the great variety of problems arising with the organization of division of 
labor. 
The comparative efficiency of different coordination forms with respect to 
various contingencies of cooperation is at stake, not firms or markets. If some-
body wants to call certain patterns of contractual relations a firm, one should. 
not object. But I do not see the real scientific benefit of such an exercise. 
However, there is greater need for a good definition of the entrepreneur, and 
his integration ,into an economic theory of organization. The entrepreneurial 
function is the starting point and the driving force of a firm, specificity of 
resources is a consequence of entrepreneurial activity. In order to put pro-
mising ideas into effect, the entrepreneur engages in different forms of con-
tracts. I think that a better understanding of the entrepreneurial function 
is very important for the advancement of an economic theory of business 
organization. This will probably demand a shift from static to dynamic analy-
sis. New Austrian concepts such as those of Israel KIRZNER [1973], which 
view the entrepreneur as somebody who discovers and temporarily exploits 
opportunities for arbitrage or for economizing of transaction costs, could 
be a fruitful starting point for further work in the field instead of wasting 
time on definitions of "the firm". What is called resource specificity in Professor 
Alchian's approach is from a dynamic standpoint an entrepreneurial investment 
in order to benefit from some arbitrage opportunity and information advantage 
discovered in the imperfect world of economic relations. 
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